UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-1-2016

State v. Kelley Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43392

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Kelley Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43392" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5818.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5818

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 43392
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) Elmore Co. Case No.
v.
) CR-2014-2438
)
JAMES LEWIS KELLEY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ELMORE
________________________
HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY
District Judge
________________________
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
P. O. Box 2816
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 334-2712

JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ....................................... 1
ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 4
Kelley Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred
In Denying His Suppression Motion ........................................................... 4
A.

Introduction...................................................................................... 4

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................................ 4

C.

Kelley Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial
Of His Suppression Motion .............................................................. 5

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. 16

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) ............................................................... 6
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) ..................................................... 4
State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328 (2012) ...................................... 6
State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 984 P.2d 703 (1999) .......................................... 5
State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 42 P.3d 706 (Ct. App. 2001) .......................... 6
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 283 P.3d 722 (2011) ....................................... 15
State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 989 P.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1999) ........................... 5
State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 152 P.3d 645 (Ct. App. 2006) ........................... 11
State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 826 P.2d 452 (1992) ....................................... 14
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 198 P.3d 128 (Ct. App. 2008) ................. 5, 14
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 51 P.3d 461 (Ct. App. 2002) ........................ 14
State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 132 P.3d 468 (Ct. App. 2006) ........................... 4
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 152 P.3d 16 (2007) ........................................... 5
State v. Howell, 159 Idaho 245, 358 P.3d 806 (Ct. App. 2015) ........................... 14
State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 127, 233 P.3d 52 (2010) ........................................ 4, 5
State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 17 P.3d 301 (Ct. App. 2000) ......................... 6
State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 187 P.3d 1261 (Ct. App. 2008) ........................ 5
State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 897 P.2d 993 (1995) ............................... 5
State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 125 P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2005) ....................... 6
State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 172 P.3d 1146 (Ct. App. 2007) .................... 6
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ........................................................................... 5

ii

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) ................................................................... 6

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
James Lewis Kelley appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana, contending the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Kelley with trafficking in marijuana after a search of
Kelley’s car by Detective Kyle Moore uncovered two black garbage bags filled
with “several clear wrapped baggies” of marijuana with a total weight in excess of
five pounds. (R., pp.9-10, 23-24, 72; 2/6/2015 Tr., p.26, Ls.7-19.) Kelley filed a
motion to suppress, claiming there was “not reasonable suspicion under the
totality of the circumstances known to Det[ective] Moore, to form particularized
suspicion that Mr. Kelley was possessing or transporting drugs. Thus, there was
no reason to lengthen the detention.” (R., p.35; see also pp.30-38.) The court
held a hearing on Kelley’s motion after which it entered a written order denying
Kelley’s request for suppression. (R., pp.55-62, 69-761; 2/6/2015 Tr., pp.5-61.)
The parties subsequently reached an agreement in which Kelley agreed to
plead guilty to an amended charge of trafficking in marijuana (at least one
1

The court entered a corrected order denying Kelley’s motion to suppress in
response to a motion to reconsider or “clarify” a footnote in the court’s original
decision in which the court indicated that the parties agreed that videos
submitted for the court’s consideration were “unusable.” (R., p.55 n.1 (original
order), 64-65 (motion to reconsider or clarify).) In its corrected order, the court
modified the footnote to exclude the reference to the parties, but to again
reiterate that the videos were not helpful because “they were mostly
unintelligible” since “[t]he wind drowned out much of the conversation.” (R., p.69
n.1.)
1

pound), and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion; the
state agreed to recommend a unified 10-year sentence with three years fixed.
(3/20/2015 Tr., pp.62-75; R., pp.80-81 (Amended Information), 82-88 (guilty plea
advisory form), 89 (written offer).)

The court imposed a unified five-year

sentence with two years fixed, and Kelley filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.,
pp.92-94 (judgment), 99-101 (notice of appeal).)

2

ISSUE
Kelley states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kelley’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as follows:
Has Kelley failed to demonstrate any error in the district court’s factual
findings or in its conclusion that there was reasonable articulable suspicion to
support Kelley’s detention?

3

ARGUMENT
Kelley Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Suppression
Motion
A.

Introduction
Kelley argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress claiming, as he did below, that there was no lawful basis to “prolong”
his traffic stop.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)

A review of the applicable law, the

evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and the district court’s factual
findings and conclusions of law support the district court’s decision to deny
Kelley’s request for suppression.2
B.

Standard Of Review
“‘[D]eterminations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be

reviewed de novo on appeal.’” State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 127, 233 P.3d 52, 58
(2010) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (brackets
original)). “[I]n conducting that review the appellate court ‘should take care both
to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to
inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
2

It is questionable, based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing,
whether Kelley met his burden of showing he had standing to challenge the
search of the car he was driving given that Kelley told Detective Moore he did not
have the phone number of the “friend” who Kelley claimed gave him permission
to drive the car (Exhibit A), and given that the car did not belong to the friend, but
was instead registered to the friend’s father (2/16/2015 Tr., p.46, L.4 – p.47,
L.17). State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 719, 132 P.3d 468, 476 (Ct. App. 2006)
(defendant has “the burden to show standing even if it has not been challenged
by the State”; authorization to use a vehicle may be shown by “permission from
the owner to borrow the car” or “permission from another person believed to have
authority over the car”). Nevertheless, the state will address the merits of
Kelley’s claims on appeal.
4

officers.’” Id. The power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.
State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v.
Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate
court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court supported by
substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706
(1999).
C.

Kelley Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and,

because it is limited in scope and duration, “it is analogous to an investigative
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth” in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Ct.
App. 2008) (citations omitted). “[T]raffic stops must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” State v. Henage,
143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007) (citation and quotations omitted).
“There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has lasted longer
than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention and the
law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop.”
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008)
(citations omitted).

The court must also consider whether the officer’s

observations during the encounter “and events succeeding the stop” gave rise to
“legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation”
which justified expanding the investigation to other possible crimes. Id.; see also

5

State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001). In
addition, it is well-settled that law enforcement may deploy a drug dog to sniff the
exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle without suspicion of drug activity so long as
doing so does not prolong the detention beyond what is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop.

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); State v.

Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-84, 125 P.3d 536, 539-40 (Ct. App. 2005); State
v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000).
Law enforcement may constitutionally search an individual’s car without a
warrant if there is “probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or
evidence of a crime.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331
(2012) (citation omitted). “Probable cause is established when the totality of the
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise—in
the mind of a reasonable person—to a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. “Probable cause is a
flexible, common-sense standard, and a practical, nontechnical probability that
incriminating evidence is present is all that is required.”

Id. (citing Texas v.

Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). An alert by a reliable, certified drug detection
dog is sufficient to establish probable cause to believe contraband is present.
State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 875, 172 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Ct. App. 2007).
Based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, which
consisted of Deputy Moore’s testimony, which the district court found credible
(R., p.69), Detective Moore’s report (Exhibit A), and Detective Moore’s
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video/audio3 (Exhibit 1), the district court made the following factual findings: (1)
Detective Moore conducted a traffic stop of the car Kelley was driving after he
observed Kelley driving slightly over the posted speed limit and saw Kelley “cross
the center dividing line twice”; (2) Kelley identified himself with an Oregon driver’s
license; (3) “Kelley’s license did not match the [vehicle] registration” and Kelley
was “not the registered owner”; (4) Kelley was “visibly trembling, even though [it]
was summer and warm”; (5) “Kelley avoided eye contact and appeared
noticeably nervous”; (6) Detective Moore noticed “Kelley’s carotid artery on the
left-hand side of the throat [was] perceptibly pulsating”; (7) Detective Moore
described the encounter as atypical; (8) “Detective Moore testified that, through
his training and experience, it’s common for people to traffic large amounts of
drugs from a source state on the west coast to the mid-west or to a consumer
state for narcotics” and that “I-84 between Oregon (a source state) and,
ultimately, Nebraska is a known drug corridor”; (9) Kelley told Detective Moore
“the car belonged to a friend and that he was driving it to Nebraska to deliver it to
him” because the “friend had been visiting him in Oregon when his friend’s
mother

died”

and

the

“friend

flew

back

to

Nebraska”;

(10)

“Detective Moore asked Kelley for the friend’s name and phone number so he
could confirm Kelley had permission to drive the car,” but “Kelley told him he did
not have the friend’s phone number” and he just planned to “go to the area and
‘wait for a phone call’” and then stay for three days and go fishing; (11) dispatch
3

The district court accurately noted that Detective Moore’s video/audio is of
limited utility. (R., p.69 n.1.) It is difficult to hear most of the conversation
between Detective Moore and Kelley due to traffic and wind noise, and the
camera angle for the video is angled toward the ground. (Exhibit 1.)
7

advised Detective Moore that Kelley “was clear and valid – no warrants”; (12)
Detective Moore decided he was not going to issue Kelley a citation for any of
the infractions, but, given the circumstances, he detained Kelley to conduct a
drug investigation; (13) Detective Moore deployed his drug K-9, which alerted on
the passenger side door; and (14) during a search of the vehicle, Detective
Moore and another officer discovered several pounds of marijuana. (R., pp.7072.) Detective Moore initiated the traffic stop at 7:18 p.m. and his drug dog
alerted at 7:32 p.m. (R., pp.70-71; 2/16/2015 Tr., p.13, Ls.10-12, p.23, L.21 –
p.24, L.2.)
Based on these findings, the district court concluded that, “based on the
totality of the circumstances, Detective Moore had a reasonable suspicion to
continue to detain Kelley for further investigation” after Detective Moore
“approached the vehicle the second time” and “had concluded his investigation of
the traffic violation.” (R., p.75.) Specifically, the court noted:
The matters giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion were
Kelley’s extreme nervousness, his lack of eye contact, his
continued trembling even though it was a warm summer evening,
the pulsing carotid artery, the fact he did not have the friend’s
phone number where he was driving a long distance to meet [him],
his suspicious story that he was simply going to drive to Nebraska
and wait for a phone call and the fact this was a known corridor for
drugs to travel from west coast states to Nebraska specifically.
(R., p.75 (footnotes omitted).)
Kelley contends the district court erred in denying his suppression motion,
specifically arguing that the district court’s factual finding regarding the “drug
corridor” was unsupported by evidence, and that the court’s conclusion that
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Detective Moore had reasonable articulable suspicion to support the detention
was incorrect. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-17.) Kelley’s claims fail.
Kelley first contends the district court’s factual findings that Kelley “was
traveling on a ‘known corridor for drugs’ from west coast states to ‘Nebraska
specifically’” and “that ‘I-84 between Oregon (a source state) and, ultimately,
Nebraska, is a known corridor’” are “not supported by substantial and competent
evidence in the record.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.11 (quoting R., pp.70, 75).) In
support of this contention, Kelley notes “[t]he entirety of Detective Moore’s
testimony on this subject” was:
Q. One additional question. Do you recall -- the registration for the
vehicle, where was it registered to?
A. The state was Nebraska. I believe Omaha.
Q. And, sir, was there anything about the fact that -- did you find
anything of note about the place where the defendant was driving
from?
A. Through my training and experience through narcotics
interdiction and drug interdiction schools, it’s common for people to
traffic large amounts of drugs from a source state. Commonly in
our area it is the west coast state to the Midwest. So I knew it to be
a consumer state for narcotics generally speaking.
Q. And based on your training and actual experience is Oregon
generally a source state?
A. Yes, it is.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-12 (quoting 2/16/2015 Tr., p.27, Ls.7-24).)
According to Kelley, this “brief testimony” demonstrates that “the district
court’s factual finding that [he] was on a ‘known corridor’ from west coast states
to ‘Nebraska specifically’ was in error” because, he asserts, “Detective Moore’s
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testimony does not provide any indication that ‘Nebraska specifically’ was the
consumer state for this precise travel route.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.) Kelley
further argues:
Detective Moore testified that Nebraska was a consumer state
“generally speaking” based solely on the fact that it happens to be
in [sic] a state in the Midwest. What is more, Detective Moore
provides no specifics on this “known corridor.” There is no
evidence to support the district court’s finding that I-84 specifically
is “a known drug corridor.” (R., p.70.) Rather, according to
Detective Moore’s testimony, all individuals who happen to be
traveling from any west coast state to the Midwest on any road in
Idaho are on this drug corridor and subject to investigation. Mr.
Kelley disputes the district court’s finding that traveling from any
west coast state to “Nebraska specifically” via I-84 is a “known
corridor for drugs.” These findings are not supported by evidence
in the record.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)
Kelley’s challenge to the district court’s factual findings is without merit.
The court’s relevant factual finding was: “Detective Moore testified that, through
his training and experience, it’s common for people to traffic large amounts of
drugs from a source state on the west coast to the mid-west or to a consumer
state for narcotics. He testified that I-84 between Oregon (a source state) and,
ultimately, Nebraska is a known drug corridor.”4

(R., p.70.)

These findings

accurately reflect Detective Moore’s testimony, excerpted above, in conjunction
with his testimony as to the travel route (I-84) to which he was referring.
(2/16/2015 Tr., p.8, Ls.8-18, p.27, Ls.7-24; see also Exhibit A (Detective Moore’s
report indicating he “was on patrol on Interstate 84”).) That Detective Moore did
4

The district court restated the same point in its analysis. (R., p.75 (“the fact this
was a known corridor for drugs to travel from west coast states to Nebraska
specifically”).) To the extent Kelley contends this was a separate factual finding,
it fails for the same reasons stated herein.
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not use the words “known drug corridor” does not mean that the district court’s
use of that phrase was unsupported by the evidence, especially given that was
exactly the point of the prosecutor’s questions and the reasonable inferences
from Detective Moore’s testimony. See State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 778-779,
152 P.3d 645, 649-650 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted) (“Even if the evidence is
equivocal and somewhat in dispute, if the trial court’s finding of fact is based on
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record, it will not be disturbed
on appeal.”). Further, contrary to Kelley’s argument, Detective Moore did not
testify that “all individuals who happen to be traveling from any west coast state
to the Midwest on any road in Idaho are on this drug corridor and subject to
investigation.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.) Even if he had made such a statement,
it would not show error in the district court’s actual factual finding. Because the
district court’s challenged factual findings are supported by substantial evidence
and are not clearly erroneous, Kelley’s challenge to the court’s findings fails. See
Garcia, 143 Idaho at 779, 152 P.3d at 650 (citations omitted) (“[O]ur standard of
review requires that we accept a trial court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. Findings will not be deemed clearly erroneous if they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record.”).
Kelley next challenges the district court’s finding that his detention was
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-16.)

With respect to the district court’s reasonable suspicion determination, Kelley
distinguishes between the facts known to Detective Moore the second time he
approached the car Kelley was driving and the facts known to Detective Moore
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when he approached the car for the third time. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-16.) The
facts known to Detective Moore based on his initial contact with Kelley included
Kelley’s nervous behavior, Kelley was shaking despite the warm temperature,
Kelley was avoiding eye contact, and Kelley’s explanation as to why he was
driving a car that did not belong to him. (2/16/2015 Tr., p.12, L.12 – p.15, L.13;
Exhibit A.) It was during this initial encounter that Kelley provided Detective
Moore with his license and the vehicle’s registration, which Detective Moore took
back to his patrol car to call into dispatch. (2/16/2015 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-20, p.36,
Ls.8-18; Exhibit A.)
After Detective Moore called in the relevant information to dispatch, and
while he was waiting for dispatch to “return,” Detective Moore made a second
contact with Kelley for the purpose of asking additional questions about Kelley’s
authority to drive the car. (2/16/2015 Tr., p.14, L.2 – p.16, L.9, p.37, L.18 – p.38,
L.1; Exhibit A.) Specifically, Detective Moore asked Kelley to provide the phone
number of the friend who supposedly asked Kelley to drive the car so Detective
Moore could call the friend and verify that Kelley had permission to be in
possession of the vehicle. (2/16/2015 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-9; Exhibit A.) It was at that
point that Kelley told Detective Moore he did not have a phone number for his
friend, and explained that he just planned to “go to the area and wait for a phone
call.” (2/16/2015 Tr., p.16, Ls.10-13; Exhibit A (report notes Kelley said he had
his friend’s address and “planned on just showing up at his friend’s house when
he got there”).) Detective Moore’s second contact with Kelley was at 7:22 and

12

lasted “[a] few minutes.” (2/16/2015 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-6, p.16, Ls.17-20; see R.
p.70.)
Detective Moore returned to his patrol car after his second contact with
Kelley and waited to hear back from dispatch and for the arrival of an assist
officer he previously requested. (2/16/2015 Tr., p.16, L.17 – p.17, L.5.) Shortly
thereafter, dispatch advised that Kelley “was clear and valid, no warrants”
(2/16/2015 Tr., p.17, Ls.6-13) – this occurred sometime between the “few
minutes” that Detective Moore spent talking to Kelley (starting at 7:22), and
Detective Moore’s third approach, which happened at 7:28 (2/16/2015 Tr., p.14,
L.2 – p.18, L.9). Although Detective Moore had already decided not to issue
Kelley any citations for the infractions he observed, the purpose of the initial stop
was not concluded until dispatch advised Detective Moore that Kelley had a valid
license and no warrants.
Nevertheless, Kelley seeks to capitalize on the district court’s statement
that “[w]hen Detective Moore approached the vehicle the second time, he had
concluded his investigation of the traffic violation” (R., p.75), presumably in an
effort to exclude his comment to Detective Moore during the second contact, that
he did not have a phone number for his friend, from the totality of the
circumstances informing whether there was reasonable articulable suspicion to
support his continued detention (Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-16). Kelley’s contention
that the purpose of the initial stop was complete at the point of the second
contact is unsupported by the facts or the law.

While the district court

undoubtedly stated that Detective Moore “had concluded the investigation of the
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traffic violation” at the time he “approached the vehicle the second time” (R.,
p.75), it is unclear whether this is a typographical error or a legal conclusion that
Detective Moore could not continue to detain Kelley on the original purpose of
the stop up to the time Detective Moore received a report back from dispatch.
The likelihood that the district court’s statement was a typographical error is
consistent with the court’s subsequent analysis of the circumstances surrounding
reasonable suspicion, which included “the fact [Kelley] did not have the friend’s
phone number where he was driving a long distance to meet [him], [and] his
suspicious story that he was simply going to drive to Nebraska and wait for a
phone call.” (R., p.75.) To the extent the court’s statement was instead a legal
conclusion, it is incorrect given that “[t]he Idaho Supreme Court has held that a
police officer’s brief detention of a driver to make a status check on the driver’s
license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Howell, 159 Idaho 245, ___, 358
P.3d 806, 809 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493, 826
P.2d 452, 454 (1992); see also State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d
128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008) (“a reasonable investigation of a traffic stop may include
asking for the driver’s license and registration, requesting that the driver sit in the
patrol car, and asking the driver about his destination and purpose”); cf. State v.
Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct. App. 2002) (“a traffic stop
may evolve into a consensual encounter if the officer returns the driver’s license,
registration and insurance documents and engages in any subsequent
questioning”).
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Considering the totality of all the relevant circumstances, the district court
correctly rejected Kelley’s request for suppression.

Kelley’s arguments on

appeal that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard was not satisfied
revolve around evidence that did not exist, such as lack of evidence that Kelley
was impaired and that the car “did not look stolen,” was not reported stolen, and
was insured, and individual minimization of the evidence that did exist.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-16.)

This argument ignores the totality of the

circumstances test and the established legal principle that “the existence of
alternative innocent explanations does not necessarily negate reasonable
suspicion.” State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 411, 283 P.3d 722, 728 (2011)
(citations omitted).

That Kelley characterizes his “travel arrangement” as

“imprudent” does not, as Kelley contends, mean it “does not add any support to
the presence of a reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.15.)

That “arrangement,” in conjunction with Kelley’s

behavior, was more than adequate to support the district court’s finding of
reasonable articulable suspicion.
Because Kelley’s initial detention was lawfully extended based on
reasonable articulable suspicion, Kelley has failed to show any error in the district
court’s decision denying his motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of
conviction entered upon Kelley’s conditional guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2016.

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.
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